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Abstract
Purpose The objective of current paper is to offer constructive
criticism and expose some serious shortcomings in the paper
published Clausen and Voll (Transp Res Rev 5:129–133,
2013) in the ETRR.
Method A literature review method is applied for the current
research paper. A technical and scientific discussion, includ-
ing organizational and policy issues in relation to rail freight
transport systems in Europe and U.S., is performed.
Result Clausen and Voll [4] ostensibly set out to draw com-
parisons between North American and European railway sys-
tems. It claims to be focused on the management and opera-
tion of carload freight and how this is organized, planned and
moved but does not develop this in adequate detail. The paper
fails to address many generic contextual differences and in-
fluences that govern the management and operation of carload
freight in both domains. It does not present a balanced or
complete set of arguments as to why one scenario is to be
preferred to the other.
The analysis in the paper is largely generic, limited and yet
arrives at robust and trenchant conclusions preferring the
North American production model without any real substan-
tiation or justification for this position being presented. The
European position is inadequately described in terms of gov-
ernance, ownership and operational models and is criticised
for its constraints and limitations without any real explanation
as to how these could be overcome. The relatively slow
evolution of the response of the US railroads to the legislation
that endowed them with greater commercial and operational
freedoms is not adequately covered. The position in Europe in
relation to a rapid sequence of interventions and directives is
also not adequately reviewed.
The paper does not demonstrate the impact of recent tech-
nologies in terms of intermodal activities despite these being
significant components of rail freight volume and revenue in
both domains. The paper also has very limited details on the
commercial and competitive realities faced by railways in
both domains including rail-on-rail, waterway and road based
competition and how this is managed by the train operators.
The paper makes superficial reference to the “Blocking
Problem” but fail to develop what this implies and how the
rail freight operators develop strategies to mitigate this.
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Learning lessons from each other
1 Purpose
This paper has been developed to expose some serious short-
comings in the content and conclusions of the paper written by
Clausen and Voll [4]. Their paper discusses much of the
economic issues surrounding European wagonload freight
services and attempts to relate this back to infrastructural
and institutional differences between the US and Canada and
the generalised European model. Wagonload in the European
context applies to the movement of cargo in individual
wagons or wagon groups between a loading point and deliv-
ery point with these single units or groups marshalled into
train length formations for the longer transit. The wagon types
for this are multitudinous and includes covered wagons
(sometimes designated as vans) capable of carrying a wide
variety of merchandise traffic. They can also be used for the
movement of palletised or unitised commodities such as lum-
ber, bagged minerals (cement). In the European context these
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types of vehicles can be either twin axle or four axle designs.
Wagonload can also include hopper wagons for the movement
of fuels, minerals, ores, timber again of varying size, weight
and volumetric capability. Tanker wagons are also used in
wagonload traffic to service the oil and chemical sectors.
The intimation in the paper is that the North American model
is inherently a more efficient and effective option without
analysing much of the context that underpins the differences.
It omits recent major railroad consolidations, the rapid rise of
inter-modal freight, the rising importance of the regional and
short line operators and growth within the US railroad sector
for block trains and also a strong residual market for carload
(wagonload) traffic commodities some of which move in
carload blocks. The term carload in the North American
context applies to those movements undertaken in separate
rail vehicles which can include box cars of varying dimen-
sions which are used primarily for higher value merchandise
traffic and can be moved in single units or as blocks of
vehicles to be assembled into train formations for long haul
movements. Box cars can also be used to move products such
as grain and lumber. Other carload traffic can include hopper
wagons for minerals, agricultural products, solid fuel (Iess
common now), ores and similar products, tank cars for liquids,
powders, granules, pellets and gases. Again these types of rail
vehicle can be moved as single units or as parts of a group of
vehicles). It also appears to downplay the routing and sched-
uling options that exist between the Class 1 and regional
railroads with short line operations to facilitate carload or
carload block movements. [2], p. 1) defines that U.S. Class I
Railroads are line haul freight railroads with 2010 operating
revenue of $398.7 million or more. The AAR (American
Association of Railroads, effectively an industry representa-
tive body) (2013, p. 1) reports that there are over 560 freight
railroads of which only seven are “Class I” railroads that
accounts for 69 % of freight rail mileage typically operating
in many different states. The AAR [1] report also suggests that
the non-Class I railroads, also known as short line and regional
railroads, range in size from tiny operations with handling of a
few carloads per month to multi-state operators not far from
Class I size.
We think that the abstract of the paper by Clausen and Voll
[4] is weak and inconsistent. Some results of the paper are
discussed in ‘method’. There are contradictions between
‘results’ and ‘conclusions’. For example, without any indi-
cation in the ‘Result’, it concludes that Europe can learn a lot
from North American railway planning models’ without any
logical linkage or supporting evidence.
We are in the opinion that the title of the original paper is to
some extent misleading due to the fact that it is mainly focused
on wagonload traffic (see for example, purpose, section 2 etc.)
and not ‘railway systems’ in the broadest sense that include
muchmore than just ‘wagonload’ freight but all types of cargo
including trainload and inter-modal traffic as well as other
components of railway systems such as signalling/control,
infrastructure issues etc. although there is some peripheral
mention of infrastructure and institutional issues.
The assertion that the share of fixed costs in total transport
costs is higher in Europe when compared to the US & Canada
is self-evident given the shorter sector distances and higher
modal competition from road freight in Europe at a national
and international level. This appears to discount the huge and
long established contextual differences between the systems
being compared in terms of geography, vertical ownership of
long wholly owned routes (infrastructure), limited cross-
border issues and long established high levels of technical
and commercial inter-operability in the North America. There
are also a large number of small yards, terminals, spurs and
sidings to deliver and collect freight cars for carload and
carload block operations. These are still being actively devel-
oped by the railroads in the US using a mixture of private and
public funding
There is some confusion between the North American
model which allegedly focuses primarily on finding short
transit times and routing for each freight carload and the
European model which the Clausen and Voll [4] intimate
focuses on consolidation and high train utilization. For
North American carload and carload blocks these are manip-
ulated as required in classification yards in transit although the
number and gross capacity of these yards has declined dra-
matically in response to block trains becoming much more the
preferred model. There has also been a significant amount of
modal transfer into inter-modal (domestic and international)
with highly productive trains operating between major termi-
nals and also the loss of merchandise traffic to road transport
where transit times and service/product quality parameters are
not adequately provided by the rail operators. Carload remains
a significant component of North American rail freight.
In mainland Europe wagonload and wagon block traffic
remains a significant although threatened element of the rail-
way’s portfolio of service options. These include a mix of
publicly (or incumbent) and privately (new entrant) provided
services covering a wide array of origins, frequencies, com-
modities and equipment. Given the wholly different geo-
graphical and operational context (much shorter transits, ro-
bust road based competition and competition for train paths
with passenger trains) the model adopted in Europe sensibly
reflects the need to consolidate wagons and wagon groups and
to secure intensive equipment utilization. Clausen and Voll [4]
suggest this reflects very centralised railway traffic pattern in
Europe. This is challenged as the individual national patterns
of operations vary widely. The evolving position of ownership
and consolidation within the North American railroad scene is
also following this trend as the Class 1 railroads seek to
maximise their revenues by retaining traffic on their systems
for as great a part of the transit rather than interchange with
other lines.
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The authors are opaque as to what Europe can learn from
North American rail road planning models. There is no men-
tion of what North America may learn from Europe in the
Clausen and Voll [4] paper. We are in the opinion that the
North American railroads can learn from European railways
as well for example, many are operating successfully under so
many restrictions. Similar views on learning lesson is
expressed by Boyer [3] who states that ‘One way of
preventing the capture of profits by varying trackage charges
is to mandate uniform charges per mile of track regardless of
track condition, timing, location, or traffic level. This is cur-
rently how pricing is done for highways and is the basis of the
current European system of separating track fees from trans-
portation charges.’ It is also unclear from Clausen and Voll [4]
as what the potential for decentralised traffic in European
railway freight traffic might be and what this might achieve.
There are more fundamental issues the freight rail operators
need to address before slavishly adopting models which may
not be appropriate. Section-wise and more specific comments
on Clausen and Voll [4] paper are noted below.
2 Introduction
Rail freight has despite the major recent economic recession
grown, as has rail passenger traffic, in recent years in response
to a mix of technical, operational, ownership and governance
changes. This has been true of European systems leading to
expressions of concern for capacity and the development of
new infrastructure. In North America which has a much more
limited passenger traffic base rail freight has grown with
particular strength in inter-modal and single commodity block
trains. An important aspect of the successful of U. S. railroad
is the deregulatory measures: the Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act known as or 4R Act of 1976; the
famous Staggers Rail Act (SRA) of 1980; and the last but not
least the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Termination
Act of 1995 (ICCTA) that allowed the operators to work in a
better competitive environment. This has resulted in not just a
fewer but stronger Class 1 railroad operators [3, 14, 11]. The
deregulation has benefited the customers as well. For exam-
ple, [1], p. 3) claims that average rail freight rates (measured
by inflation-adjusted revenue per ton-mile) were 44%t lower
in 2012 than in 1981. North American rail freight still includes
a high proportion of carload or carload groups and this reflects
the remaining high availability of sidings, spurs and industrial
branches together with the pro-active regional and small line
railroads that actively support and service this type of traffic.
The regional and short line model may be an option to be
developed much further in Europe as a means of capturing
traffic back to rail.
In Europe the withdrawal of services and the removal of
infrastructure that previously supported wagonload freight has
been an ongoing feature as rail has retreated or abandoned
traffic primarily to road services. In addition rail in Europe has
been less-well focused in terms of developing new sidings and
industrial sites with a rail connection as an integral part of the
railway’s product and service portfolio compared to North
America as commercial and industrial criteria and siting re-
quirements have evolved. Some national railway operators in
Europe (e.g. SNCF) have again been considering the reduc-
tion or abolition of wagonload traffic activities as a cost saving
measure. Reducing the cost of operation, enhancing produc-
tivity and generating net new incremental revenue to achieve
profitability do not appear to have been synchronised initia-
tives to maintain wagonload activities as part of a portfolio of
rail freight services.
Rail in Europe is faced with universally available, aggres-
sive and highly competent road freight services for domestic
and international traffic over relatively short distance sectors
across the entire commodity spectrum and it dominates the
inter-urban freight market. As a consequence rail has lost
share in the higher value, time sensitive flows (which are
governed by imperatives the rail sector has had difficulty
accommodating) that have emerged and as a consequence
tended to focus on the less demanding block train model for
inter-modal and bulk commodity flows. Clausen and Voll [4])
appear to have overlooked the complex mass of technical,
operational, managerial and governance issues that have led to
the present position and appear to be favouring a position
where benefits will only flow from the adoption of North
American systems.
Rail freight in North America is also faced with aggressive
and near universally available road transport for general and
specialist cargo applications which has effectively displaced
rail from short and medium sector transit lengths on grounds
of cost, service levels, responsiveness and availability. The
overall position of road freight is being questioned by the
current administration in relation to the levels of emissions
and congestion it generates as well as the levels of infrastruc-
ture attrition and wear attributable to heavy vehicle activity.
3 Railway planning problems
The need to be able to move single wagonloads or small
wagonload groups (not necessarily for the same shipper or a
common commodity but they could be) implies the use of
train aggregation to a cost effective formation to justify the
direct operational costs (train path, crew, traction, fuel, main-
tenance) and some form of contribution to overheads. These
operations are undertaken at marshalling yards to concentrate
the train and for the reciprocal dispersal of wagons at the
identified receiving yard prior to final delivery. The model is
well established and similar model or concept is applied in
other transport sector as well, for example, maritime shipping
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and gives flexibility to train operators in terms of building,
mixing and breaking down trains. The decision making
criteria in terms of pricing, routing, manipulation in transit
can vary widely and be influenced by shipper requirements
(urgent transit, lower order priority) and also the railroads
desire to maximise its revenue if wagons/railcars are, in the
case of the U. .S/Canada, needed to be exchanged with other
lines. Issues such as running rights and traffic exchange are
well established aspects which the authors are opaque on. A
recent European Commission funded (under FP6) project [13,
12], which has been subsequently converted into a wholly
commercial operation after the funding was ceased in August
2012, was based around two primary hubs for traffic aggre-
gation and dispersal with a long haul sector over international
routes using a mix of incumbent and privately owned traction
and wagons and the involvement of many terminal and
shunting service providers to aggregate and disperse the
wagons and wagon groups. The Retrack Trains, operated by
new entrant SME operator, were run to a schedule rather than
building train length and weight to justify the long haul
moves. Some of the Retrack trains were of very limited length
as the service was developed but operated to sustain shipper
confidence and also for traction and wagon balancing.
The planning problems, as elucidated by Clausen and
Voll[4]), are essentially generic railway problems and apply in
various forms in Europe and North America and present no
immediate innovative insight. Railroads can chose (or not) to
link the tactical perspective and the live operational phase which
can and is subject to a mix of internal and external influences
(e.g. seasonal traffic commodity demands, weather, interchange
options). The use of system wide “war rooms” allowing the
whole railway to be seen as an entity has been used by the larger
Class 1 railroads in North America and European railways are
moving to a similar scenario with reduced numbers of control
centres. The higher density of traffic plus the volatile demands of
the passenger component (domestic and international) imply the
requirement for a different set of response mechanisms and
balancing of passenger and freight priorities.
Clausen and Voll [4] claims that ‘Section 2 provides infor-
mation about planning processes in wagonload traffic in gen-
eral.’ There is no detailed or developed discussion on US
wagonload planning policy, issues or the generic context.
The paper poorly defines the ‘Blocking Problem’ which is
the apparent central theme of the paper.
The tactical planning problem which Clausen and Voll [4]
develop in their paper reflects a position primarily aimed at
cost reduction rather than seeking revenue/profit maximiza-
tion and has become detached from the prevailing operational
and commercial pressures set by shippers. The routing of
wagons /freight cars either individually or in blocks is subject
to a mass of technical, operational and commercial impera-
tives so a generalised model (Blocking Problem) aimed pri-
marily to reduce costs could readily lose touch with the reality
of sustaining a routinely commercially competitive portfolio
of service offers. The impact of inter-modal traffic further
complicates this position with a range of product and service
offers available in North America including trailers on flat cars
(TOFC), twin stack domestic and twin stack international
containers. These very high productivity options are not yet
available in Europe although European inter-modal traffic
operation is so far efficient and effective within the constraints
of the infrastructure.
4 Survey on railway models
The author’s review of the Blocking Problem was focused on
certain key aspects required for their comparison of European
and North American planning systems, methods & problems
in railway freight traffic. The section in the Clausen and Voll
[4] paper “Survey on railway models” could usefully have
included a diagram or graph to show the network and nodes
with arcs, yards, stations and the other components but these
are again not described in detail.
The use of the directed graph option as a device to model a
rail road network is not contested but as with all modelling
safeguards and vigilance is required to maintain integrity. The
constraints identified by Clausen and Voll [4] are generalised.
The “split table” allows variable routing by wagons/carloads.
This overlooks the imperatives that govern the shipment
which may favour a particular routing option to ensure on
time arrival even at a revenue penalty such as an earlier or less
favourable handover to another system or systems from the
originating railroad. Alternatively if there is a lower order of
priority for wagons/carloads to be held awaiting available
traction and train services then alternative routes and sched-
ules may be invoked. These are the commercial and compet-
itive realities under which the train operators engage and offer
their train services with differing degrees of priority. Inter-
modal traffic operation adds a wholly different dimension to
all of this.
North America railroads retain, as intimated earlier, many
routing options and infrastructure for what is effectively large-
ly domestic traffic. European railway undertakings have to
contend with a multiplicity of international borders (facing
bureaucratic and time consuming cross-border clearance is-
sues that are absent for trucking companies) although these are
now of lesser significance than in the past. The routing pref-
erences may vary within a national domain and this represents
a measure of resilience and connectivity that yields benefits in
the event of disruption. The European 2011 White Paper on
Transport outlined that infrastructure has to be planned in a
way that maximises the positive impact on economic growth
and minimises the negative impact on the environment [9].
The recent designations of freight and passenger corridors -
The Core Network Corridors – that are aimed provide the
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essential infrastructure for carrying freight and passenger [7].
Now the European railways tend to emphasise the high ca-
pacity main lines as the preferred axes where investment has
been channelled to accommodate high volumes of traffic. In
some respects this is not dissimilar to the focus on the main
lines within the major Class 1 railroads in the US and Canada
as the primary conduits for traffic much of which is routinely
moving between known origin and destination points.
The proportion of traffic which is effectively either new or
established seeking an optimal (time of departure/time of
arrival/cost/security/reliability) routing options as a proportion
of total traffic within any railroad domain is governed by a
mass of internal railway and external shipper requirements.
The proportion of repetitive business using established or
preferred routing can vary but high levels of contracted repeat
business comprises a high proportion of carload rail traffic
activity. Shippers can elect to nuance their movement patterns
as part of their particular supply chain activities and opera-
tional and commercial priorities.
For a new market entrant (not an incumbent) in Europe the
ability to offer a range of point to point options or bespoke
services has been demonstrated by the RETRACK [13] pro-
ject. Rail has, and this has accounted for some loss of markets
to competing modes, not generally been able to respond as
adequately to shipper’s enquiries for very short term and spot
type movements to the same extent as road freight because of
the inability to indicate service availability options, schedules,
routes operated, space and weight availability leading to traf-
fic attrition. The development of initiatives such as the recent-
ly launched Freight Arranger (details on http://freightarranger.
co.uk/) system in the UK is an example of how these issues
can be addressed and resolved within one system. Governance
issues including open access and the relatively lower priority
afforded to freight in Europe go some way towards explaining
this. The North American Class 1 railroads by comparison are
vertically integrated and operate along wholly commercial
lines against other major and regional rail operators and
strong road and river based freight competitors.
The formation, classification, re-classification in transit and
ultimate delivery of rail cars to receiver’s sidings and depots is
a fundamental part of railway operating practice but one
which has declined in the face of road based competition for
short and medium haul sectors. The emergence of inter-modal
options has deleted the need for some of this activity with the
inter-modal units being moved to/from the terminals and
railhead by truck. The need for intermediate re-classification
or marshalling is reduced as a consequence but rail has par-
ticipated in flows from which it might otherwise have been
excluded. Certainly containers/TOFC can be and are moved
between trains and this implies a cost but the railroads in their
rate making build this component into their commercial posi-
tioning. The use of pre-formed wagon/carload blocks to min-
imise terminal dwell time is also an option. The constraints
identified in Table 1 (in [4], p. 131) are effectively the business
norms within which the railroads operate.
5 Comparison of European and North American railways
This section effectively sets out a sketch of the primary
differences between the North American and European rail
freight positions. The U. S. undertook reforms (in particular
SRA of 1980) effectively to stop most of the railroads going
under financially in the 1980s. It took a long time for the full
freedoms (freedom to negotiate secret rates with shippers,
labour reform, the option to reject non-profitable traffic etc.)
to be recognised and turned to positive commercial effect [3,
14, 11]. In contrast, the European Railways are yet to imple-
ment such reforms, although the European liberalization pro-
cess has been effectively an accounting means to get a grip on
the levels of expenditure being made by the national incum-
bents on infrastructure and operations. The degree of applica-
tion and reform including open access to new entrants has also
been diverse within the EU. Some consolidation and acquisi-
tions have been made within Europe and there is continuing
debate about the ownership model which is competitive and
transparent.
North American railroads are primarily focused on freight
with minimal interaction with passenger traffic other than
around major cities. In Europe passenger traffic activity has
grown and is a constraint on making freight path availability
particularly given the length, weight and low power to weight
ratio of existing freight train technologies (e.g. with on aver-
age axle load of 22.5 to 25 tonnes as opposed to 32–35 tonnes
in the U. S.). Freight is moved during the day in many
European countries despite the original author’s apparent
belief that this is not feasible.Much depends on the scheduling
of the full array of passenger and freight services requested to
and approved by the infrastructure manager and the ability to
manipulate these if not required or they are compromised by
delay. We agree with the idea that the wide variability of train
length maxima within Europe is a constraint but we disagree
with the notion that North American trains are totally unre-
stricted as issues such as train weight, braking, gradients,
power requirements and the ability to enter/exit terminals or
yards are germane. The North American position is not as
wide open as the authors appear to indicate. Train lengths in
North America have traditionally been much longer than in
Europe reflecting the geographical context and the nature of
the operations (largely unscheduled with freight awaiting a
justification point for an operation to be undertaken) although
there has been a recent move towards many more scheduled
operations. Europe by comparison had perforce to work with-
in a more disciplined scheduled position imposed by meeting
passenger train requirements first. Again we refer to the
RETRACK [13] train operation that was routinely able to
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secure train paths through some of the most active and inten-
sively used rail lines in Europe on an ad-hoc basis and has
continued to do so since the project moved into full scale
commercial operations following initial support from the EC.
Clausen and Voll [4] do not develop the position on the extent
of the railway reforms and various follow up measures de-
signed to drive the whole strategic move into a more liberal-
ized and competitive position including rail on rail and rail on
road competition. Some countries (e.g. UK) have adopted the
full separation model and driven the pace of reform simulta-
neously with privatization and the advocacy of open access.
Other incumbents have been slower to adopt the reforms (e.g.
SNFC) and are being pursued by the EC for a failure to
comply.
Twin stack has been a relatively new but eminently suc-
cessful development (30+ years in the making) in North
America for domestic and international container traffic where
the generosity of the loading gauge has allowed this option to
be exploited. Maximum train lengths in Europe reflect the
constraints of the existing technology; operations and com-
mercial models the rail operators have perforce to work with-
in. The increasing use of block trains and wagonload/carload
blocks with a minimum requirement for intermediate marshal-
ling or re-classification offers a means of enhancing compet-
itiveness within these constraints. The economic impact that
resulted in the withdrawal of rail facilities in much of Western
Europe to service industrial and commercial sites is to be
regretted. Rail will have to re-position itself to this either by
re-investment and the re-commissioning (e.g. being done in
the UK) of such links or advocate the inclusion of rail lines in
any new major logistics developments as an integral planning
requirement if it is to come back into contention with wagon/
carload based traffic and commodities. Inter-modal as an
option has major advantages but is not wholly appropriate
for all traffic applications.
To be competitive and cost competitive implies challeng-
ing the existing operational, technical and commercial
models, driving asset productivity up by factor levels and
the reciprocal of taking costs out to compete with alterna-
tives. More but possibly smaller point to point traffic flows
with no need for intermediate manipulation or classification
based on much reduced response times, rapid path, crew
and resource allocation would represent a major advance
and bring rail into contention for more wagon/carload or
wagon group traffic. Recent deliberations within the UK
based Freight Transport Association (FTA) were aimed at
the possibility of using wholly different train formation
sizes and concepts with the possibility of smaller but faster
trains able to operate at passenger train speeds [10]. The
ability to access and depart more readily into terminals,
sidings and logistics parks to expand rail’s market “reach”
compared with orthodox long formations also underlines
the potential of this approach. Rail will need to maximise
the energy efficiency and speed endowments it has to
regain competitiveness. The differential in speeds between
passenger and freight trains is a limitation where these
flows conflict particularly at peak times. Driving up freight
train speed using orthodox technology implies the use of
multiple or more powerful locomotives at additional cost
(ultimately to be reflected into pricing). The length of
freight trains also has implications for train sequencing
and how to respond to disruptions in train operations.
Neither of these points was developed or discussed by
Clausen and Voll [4].
6 Conclusions for planning processes
Clausen and Voll [4] conclude that the North American rail-
roads are able to move wagons through their networks rela-
tively much cheaper than in Europe. They fail to develop or
address the major contextual differences including ownership,
governance, absence of intensive passenger traffic and the
retention of many rail linked sidings, and spurs that can
support a many-to-many set of routing options. Equally the
absence of restricting international borders and longer sector
lengths is passed over. Rail in North America is not particu-
larly competitive or effective at sector lengths of less than 500
miles and has abandoned or been driven out of sector length
flows of this distance or less. Movement costs are claimed to
be a lower proportion of total costs in North America. The
focus on individual car movement costs disaggregates the
decision making process down but neglects the routine com-
mercial position where wagons/freight cars are moved in
groups or blocks from a common point to a common destina-
tion where this degree of detail, whilst useful, for management
and commercial purposes can be irrelevant or unnecessary. The
focus on individual car costs as the primary routing decision
making item potentially drives routing solutions to constrained
paths or routes which can then trigger issues of capacity and
cargo priority. The reality of shipper revisions of traffic in
transit, changes in routing preference, scheduling, equipment
types and a host of other practical issues are not discussed yet
they have a major bearing on the reality of moving rail freight. .
The deletion of the need to move wagons/freight cars through
classification yards is an increasingly common trend with pre-
formed blocks of wagons grouped into formations but is not
discussed or elaborated upon.
The authors’ explanation of the apparent higher costs in
Europe is not clearly developed or explained.Wagonloads and
wagon groups are aggregated within individual railway do-
mains (national traffic remains a high proportion of total
traffic activity so control is retained by the train operators/
service providers on a basis similar to that as practices in
North America). A many-to -many service network was of-
fered by rail operators in the not too distant past but failed to
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respond and develop to evolving location and service criteria
better provided by road freight. Such a network operation
would be prohibitively expensive to own, operate and main-
tain for low and intermittent traffic volumes using existing
technology, operational and commercial models and also be
unattractive compared with road based alternatives that can
and do offer services that rail of itself cannot provide. Inter-
modal traffic operation options go some way to offset this
using terminal networks for domestic national traffic flows
(including deep sea containers and also freight compatible
with unitised modules) and also for international traffic within
Europe. The assertion that fixed costs account for up to 50 %
of the total costs of train operations is not substantiated nor is
the contention that costs of train operation are not linked
significantly to the degree of capacity (line? wagon assets?).
As a result of the Railway Reforms Packages, European train
operators have had to acknowledge and absorb the cost of
train paths and compete for these with other operators and
other types of train services and reflect them in their cost
structure and pricing.
Within a closed system in North America how train path
costs are identified and allocated to a specific train or wagon
movement is not clear cut and is complicated by issues for
example such as time available for use but not utilized. How
this dead time is attributed or allocated as a cost function is
also not addressed. At least one of the Class 1 railroads had
until recently no clear idea as to where it was spending capital
on infrastructure, how much it was spending and what the
return on the investment was likely to be and how this was
derived and validated. The North American position is not
necessarily more developed than that in Europe (see for ex-
ample, [3]) as the authors claim. Both systems have been
reformed from without which speaks volumes as to the rail-
ways ability (or inability) to successfully identify and address
key strategic governance and commercial issues.
It is far from clear in the Clausen and Voll [4] paper that
Europe can learn a lot from North American practice. The
European railways were virtually all state owned and financed
by governments/ministries. Financial and accounting practice
varied widely together with issues such as deficit financing.
The Railway Reform Packages (in particular the First Railway
Package) were initially aimed at splitting infrastructure and
operational accounting [6, 5] but has blossomed into a much
wider package of reforms (for example in the Fourth Railway
Packages) aimed at driving the European rail sector into a
more competitive posture [8]. This is still an evolving process.
Response to the Staggers Act took years to be absorbed and
developed successfully. Clausen and Voll [4] do not recognise
this in their paper. The distance context, acute short haul road
based competition, legacy issues as how industrial and com-
mercial patterns have evolved, interaction with passenger
services and a mass of varied national technical and operating
criteria are not new in Europe.
Wagonload freight on a mass point to point operation with
low and intermittent traffic volumes has been virtually wiped
out or is planned to be seriously downgraded in several
European domains. Existing train technologies, operating
methods and commercial practice are perceived as being
increasingly inappropriate for shipper’s requirements which
have been fully fulfilled by a dynamic road freight sector
which has set the bar in terms of service, cost, availability,
reliability and responsiveness. The whole rail freight product
and service offer needs to be wholly and rigorously trans-
formed if it is to retain a measure of competitiveness and
attractiveness to shippers who do after all have modal options
to work with.
Clausen and Voll [4] advocate the adoption of a more
flexible and more efficient European railway system to reflect
the North Americanmodel. This is too simplistic. This implies
some strategic changes in terms of asset management, respon-
siveness in terms of service availability, space and weight
availability, dynamic scheduling and line capacity
management/path allocation as well as driving productivity
higher on a much reduced cost base. These issues are being
addressed and it is simplistic to suggest they are not. The
RETRACK [13] freight train operation put down markers as
to what could be achieved operating a fully privatized inter-
national wagonload/wagon group service between two prima-
ry concentration points with traffic assembled and dispatched
between these. The movement of wagons/wagon groups to
and from these was overseen by local shunting service pro-
viders but the cost element of this was reflected in the pricing.
The option of “satellite” movements on/off the main line of
route (Cologne-Budapest) was also developed and demon-
strated the flexibility of the concept. The notion of following
a “pure strategy” approach which entails a unique successor
node for traffic with common or near common destinations is
not tenable. The railways need to be as flexible and responsive
as possible to the shipper’s requirements and not be setting a
rigid supply side position.
Clausen and Voll [4] appear to be in thrall of the North
American model and suggest the adoption of concepts,
techniques, systems and methods to support rail freight
activity in Europe. This is challenged at a strategic level
and in detail. The wholly different governance, technical,
operational and competitive context precludes much of
this.
7 Summary
Clausen and Voll [4] emphasise the complexity and issues
arising within the European position with passenger and
freight trains operating simultaneously. We argue that this
works well in many European railway domains and thus
should not be disparaged. They conclude that there needs to
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be a balanced trade-off between transport costs and classifi-
cation (marshalling). We think that for a growing proportion
of European rail freight classification is irrelevant as point to
point operations have developed to maximize asset produc-
tivity and commercial competitiveness using current technol-
ogy and operating models. The downside of the concentration
on block trains and wagon groups is that there is a risk that rail
is not able to compete for small and intermittent traffic flows
using a universal train type product and service model. Rail
needs to think about how it may address this much more
complex and dynamic sector and develop attractive and com-
petitive options. The replacement of wagonload by domestic
inter-modal services may go some way to addressing the loss
of competitiveness using orthodox train technologies and
operations but there are real limitations on this in terms of
the compatibility of loading gauges to allow large inter-modal
units and trailers to circulate widely on rail.
Clausen and Voll [4] allude to the need to abandon
“pure strategy” to make planning processes more flexible.
We argue that many European rail freight operators al-
ready do this on a routine basis with a move from long
term through to real time train planning/cargo allocation
and movement plans all being very flexible to reflect
commercial and operational positions. The RETRACK
[13] freight train operation model gives some consider-
able insight and offers a good starting point to demon-
strate exactly what the authors are suggesting to abandon
([4], p. 132) was successfully applied in practice recently.
We agree with the authors that further scientific and
robust research is needed to explore the issues further.
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